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ABSTRACT
This review essay examines whether too-big-to-fail is as serious a problem as Gary Stern and Ron
Feldman contend. This essay argues that Stern and Feldman overstate the importance of the too-big-
to-fail problem and do not give enough credit to the FDICIA legislation of 1991 for improving bank
regulation and supervision. However, this criticism of the Stern and Feldman book does not detract
from many of its messages. Even if the too-big-to-fail problem is not as serious as they contend, the
policies they outline can make it less likely that a banking crisis will occur even if driven by other
factors.
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Banking institutions are especially well suited to minimizing transaction costs and
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  This is why banks are “special” and play such an
important role in the financial system.  When banks fail, the information capital they have
developed may disappear, and as a result, many borrowers will not have access to funds to pursue
productive investment opportunities.
2  Indeed, if a large enough number of banks fail at the same
time, in other words a banking panic occurs, the economy’s ability to channel funds to those with
productive investment opportunities may be severely hampered, leading to a full-scale financial
crisis and a large decline in investment and output.  Indeed, the worst economic downturns are
almost always associated with bank panics and financial crises, and not only has this been true in
the United States when the Great Depression was triggered by banking panics (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963, Bernanke, 1983, and Mishkin, 1991), but it has been true in recent years in
emerging market countries (Mishkin, 1996, Bordo and Eichengreen,  2002).
Concerns about bank panics have led most governments throughout the world to provide
a safety net for the banking system.  Federal government deposit insurance, a guarantee of
repayment for depositors, was established in the United States when the FDIC (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) started operations in 1934.  Deposit insurance can short circuit bank panics
by providing protection for depositors.  When a depositor has fully insured deposits, up to
$100,000 of deposits in the United States, the depositor doesn’t need to run to the bank to make
a withdrawal when she is worried about the bank’s health because her deposits will be worth 100
cents on the dollar no matter what.  Hence, deposit insurance can short circuit runs on banks and
bank panics and can overcome reluctance by depositors to put their funds into the banking system.
For the first thirty years after the FDIC was created, only six countries emulated the United
States and adopted deposit insurance.  However, this began to change in the late 1960s, with the
trend accelerating in the 1990s when the number of countries adopting deposit insurance doubled
to over seventy and now is close to 90 (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002, and Demirguc-Kunt,
Kane and Laeven, 2005) .  Deposit insurance is now the norm in much of the world.
Deposit insurance is not the only way in which governments provide a safety net for
depositors.  Even without explicit deposit insurance, many countries provide a safety net by
providing direct support to domestic banks.  This support is sometimes provided by lending from
the central bank to troubled institutions as part of the central bank’s lender of last resort role or
by direct government infusion of cash into these institutions.
The good news of having a government safety net is that it can prevent bank panics, as it
has since the establishment of the FDIC in the 1930s.  The bad news is that creates moral hazard
incentives for banks to take on greater risk.  When a depositor is fully protected, she knows that
she will not suffer losses if a bank fails, and thus has little incentive to monitor the bank’s-2-
activities and withdraw funds if the bank is taking on too much risk.  Without this discipline from
depositors, banks know that they can engage in risky activities with impunity, and this can
increase the probability of bank failures.
The moral hazard created by a government safety net is even more severe for large banking
institutions because when they fail, it can lead to systemic risk in which the whole banking system
is threatened.  The failure of a large institution not only can cause immediate failures of its
counterparties in both the banking and the rest of the financial system, but can also lead to a crisis
of confidence that may spill over to other banks and financial institutions, leading to a cascade of
failures and a financial crisis.  Given the potential costs to the economy from a large bank failure,
governments are very reluctant to let large banking institutions fail, or if they do, impose any costs
on depositors, even if deposit insurance is limited to a fixed amount, say $100,000.  A particular
manifestation of this phenomenon occurred when Continental Illinois, then one of the ten largest
banks in the United States became insolvent in May 1984.  Not only did the FDIC guarantee
depositors up to the $100,000 insurance limit, but it also guaranteed all accounts exceeding
$100,000 and even prevented losses for Continental Illinois bondholders.  Shortly thereafter, the
Comptroller of the Currency (the regulator of U.S. national banks) testified to Congress that
eleven of the largest banks would receive a similar treatment to that of Continental Illinois.
Although the Comptroller did not use the term “too-big-to-fail” (which was actually used by
Congressman McKinney in those hearings), this term now is applied to a policy in which the
government provides guarantees of repayment of large uninsured creditors of the largest banks,
so that no depositor or creditor suffers a loss,  even when they are not automatically entitled to this
guarantee.  (The “too-big-to-fail” characterization is somewhat of a misnomer because under the
too-big-to-fail policy, banks are often closed or merged into another bank, and then the managers
are often fired and the equityholders in the bank lose much of their investment.)
The too-big-to fail policy increases the moral hazard problem for big banks.  If a deposit
insurance agency like the FDIC were willing to close a bank and pay off  depositors only up to the
$100.000 insurance limit, large depositors would suffer losses if the bank failed.  Thus they would
have incentives to monitor the bank’s activities closely and pull their money out if the bank is
taking on too much risk.  To prevent such a loss of deposits, the bank would be less likely to
engage in risky activities.  However, once large depositors know that a bank is too-big-to-fail, they
have no incentive to monitor the bank because no matter what the bank does, large depositors will
not suffer any losses.  The result of the too-big-to-fail policy is that large banks are likely to take
on greater risks, thereby making bank failures more likely.  Indeed, this is exactly what we saw
happen in the United States in the 1980s when large banks took on riskier loans than smaller
commercial banks which led to higher loan losses for big banks (Boyd and Gertler, 1993).-3-
Many analysts have argued that the the landmark legislation in 1991, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),  improved banking regulation substantially
and has made the too-big-to-fail problem less severe.  Gary Stern, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and Ron Feldman,  a vice president of the Bank, both insiders in
the world of bank regulation and supervision, have written a book that argues that not only was
the too-big-to-fail policy a serious problem in the past, but that it was not fixed by FDICIA.
Furthermore, it has even gotten worse in recent years because of the increasing size and
complexity of banking organizations.  Given the severity of the problem, Stern and Feldman
believe that it is imperative that policymakers adopt policy measures to deal with it. 
In this review essay, I examine whether too-big-to-fail is as serious a problem as Stern
and Feldman believe it is.   My view is that they overstate the importance of the too-big-to-fail
problem and do not give enough credit to FDICIA for improving bank regulation and
supervision.  However, this criticism of the book should not detract from many of its messages.
Too-big-to-fail is still a problem of great concern to bank regulators.
I.
How Big a Problem Was Too-Big-To-Fail
After an initial introductory chapter which lays out the basic messages of their book,
chapter two provides an insightful discussion of what the problem is all about.  Stern and
Feldman stress, quite rightly, that the too-big-to-fail problem is due to a lack of credibility of
policymakers’ commitment to not bail out large banks.   This lack of credibility is just another
manifestation of the time-inconsistency problem first discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Calvo (1978).  Policymakers’ pledge not to engage in a bailout of large bank is not time
consistent: when a large bank is about to fail, policymakers will want to renege on their pledge
because they want to avoid the systemic risk that the failure of the bank would entail.
Uninsured creditors knowing that policymakers have incentives to renege will assume that the
bailout will occur and thus will not monitor large banks sufficiently, leading to the too-big-to
fail problem.  Stern and Friedman also point out that lower caps on deposit insurance or
elimination of deposit insurance altogether are also not credible and are subject to the same
time-inconsistency problem.
This innovative way of thinking about too-big-to-fail leads to an important implication
for the policy debate.  In order to reduce the too-big-to-fail problem, the incentives for
policymakers to renege on a no bailout commitment has to be reduced, which requires policy
measures that reduce the costs of a failure of a large bank to the financial system by reducing-4-
the spillovers from such a failure.  With less of an incentive for policymakers to renege on no
bailout pledges, uninsured creditors will worry that large risk-taking banks will expose the
creditors to losses and so creditors will pull funds from these banks, thereby imposing market
discipline that will reduce moral hazard risk-taking by these banks.
Chapter three contains an excellent discussion of why a too-big-to-fail policy is costly.
Stern  and Feldman point out that not only does too-big-to-fail increase risk-taking by banks
which increases the likelihood of banking crises, but it also leads to resource misallocation.  The
possibility of a bank bailout makes it more likely that banks will not operate in a cost-efficient
manner and also may innovate less.  One important misallocation that they do not mention is
that the presence of too-big-to-fail encourages banks to grow in size to take advantage of the
too-big-to-fail subsidy, so that banks will be larger than is socially optimal and there will be too
many bank mergers.
Chapter four discusses the evidence on whether too-big-to-fail is a pervasive problem.
The key to the severity of the too-big-to-fail being a problem is that the market expects that
government bailouts occur.  The chapter contains a very clear review of the evidence that the
market reflects too-big-to-fail.  Event studies have shown that the testimony by the Comptroller
of the Currency in the aftermath of the Continental Illinois bailout that the eleven largest banks
would be subject to the too-big-to fail policy did experience higher returns than other banks
after this announcement.
3 Furthermore, there is evidence in market reactions that too-big-to-fail
coverage spread to other banking institutions not on the Comptroller’s original list.  Mergers
undertaken by the largest banks result in an increase in market value for shareholders, while this
is not the case for smaller banks, suggesting that the market has priced in the subsidy to larger
banks from too-big-to-fail.  Costs of deposits also appear to be lower for larger banks that
benefit from too-big-to-fail.  Credit ratings also appear to reflect too-big-to-fail, with larger
banks having higher credit ratings when they take account of possible government support.
Yields on bonds issued by banks (which are typically quite large) in the early to mid 1980s did
not seem to reflect much risk.
Stern and Feldman also argue that too-big-to-fail has played an important role in the
numerous banking crises throughout the world that have occurred in the last two decades.  I find
this argument more suspect.  They cite statements like that by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000)
that “‘Unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated capitalization,
debtor bailouts, and regulatory forbearance’ are associated with a tenfold increase in the fiscal
cost of banking crises,” (Stern and Feldman, 2004, p. 40) as supporting their position.  Although
I agree with Honohan and Klingebiel’s characterization of banking crises, it is more accurate
to attribute banking crises not to too-big-to-fail, but rather to “too-politically-important-to-fail”-5-
which includes almost all banks.  This is certainly true for emerging market countries, where
bankers are particularly powerful, leading governments to bail out almost all banks.  It was also
true in the United States.  The savings and loan crisis was not caused by too-big-to-fail: none
of these thrift institutions were sufficiently large to pose systemic risk from one of their failures.
Rather it was the willingness of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBBB) and its deposit
insurance agency, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to prop up the
entire savings and loan industry, including almost all small S&Ls (Kane, 1989).  Stern and
Feldman even note on page 12 that “between 1979 and 1989, when roughly 1,100 commercial
banks failed, 99.7% of all deposit liabilities were fully protected through the discretionary
actions of U.S. policymakers.”  It was not just the large banks whose  uninsured creditors
received guarantees on their deposits.  Additional evidence that too-big-to-fail has not played the
key role in producing banking crises is provided in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005) who
do not find a positive relationship between banking system concentration and the likelihood of a
banking crisis.  
Stern and Feldman demonstrate convincingly that too-big-to-fail was a serious problem,
but there is a tendency in their book to argue that it was the problem. Although  bank bailouts
have been the source of serious moral hazard risk taking on the part of banks that has led to the
very costly banking crises throughout the world, too-big-to-fail has not played a dominant role in
most banking crises. It was not dominant in most banking crises in developed countries, with the
U.S.’s S&L crisis being one notable example, but it has been even less dominant in emerging
market countries where it has been the political process which bails out almost all banking
institutions that has  been the driving force behind banking crises.
4   This disagreement with Stern
and Feldman is not trivial because it has important implications for evaluating  bank regulatory
and supervisory policies such as those in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act (FDICIA) of 1991.
II.
What is the Source of Too-Big-to-Fail?
In Chapter Five, one of the most fascinating chapters in the book, Stern and Feldman dig
into what motivates policymakers to engage in too-big-to-fail policies.  They see three motivations
for policymakers to adopt too-big-to-fail: 1) they worry about the economy-wide consequences
of large bank failures, 2) they are motivated by personal rewards, and 3) they want to direct credit.
The first motivation is based on the view that policymakers have a desire to act in the-6-
public interest.  Policymakers bail out uninsured creditors because of their concerns that losses to
creditors at a large bank will spill over to other banks, thus leading to a systemic shock to the
banking system that could be very costly.  Stern and Feldman acknowledge that there is an
alternative view that the threat of spillovers is greatly overstated and so does not provide a
motivation for too-big-to-fail.  However, Stern and Feldman (p. 47) conclude: “In the end,
however, we think that the alternative view does not present a persuasive enough case to convince
policymakers to give up their concern about spillovers.  Thus simply articulating the alternative
view is unlikely to reduce the likelihood of TBTF bailouts.”  Given their insider experience in
bank supervision and regulation, Stern and Feldman’s judgement here is telling.  They also
provide evidence in Chapter 7 that policymakers concerns about spillovers are central in their
decisions whether to engage in a bail out or not.  Their views are also consistent with what I saw
when I was an official in the Federal Reserve System.  Although not said outright, I suspect that
Stern and Feldman agree with policymakers’ concerns.  Even if there is a small chance that
spillovers may cause serious damage to the financial system, policymakers will be reluctant to risk
letting these spillovers occur because the consequences could be so dire.  Indeed, this is consistent
with Alan Greenspan’s (2003) “risk management” approach to monetary policymaking.
The second motivation is that policymakers pursue too-big-to-fail because of personal gain,
which might be characterized as “too personally important to fail”.    This is a classic case of the
principal-agent problem at work and has been emphasized by Edward Kane (1989, 1991).    Bank
supervisors are ultimately agents for the public because the public bears the cost of any losses as
a result of supervisory failures.  Regulators and supervisors, however, may have incentives that
differ from the public and might prop up banks in order not to have failures on their watch that
would make them look bad or because they accede to pressures from  powerful bankers they
supervise in order to acquire better jobs in the private sector.  Although less prevalent in the
United States, where there have been very few scandals involving bank supervisors, corruption
can also be a source of favorable treatment of powerful banks. 
The third motivation is that policymakers may want to bail out banks because it makes it
easier for the government to direct credit.  Protecting large banks which are often government-
controlled institutions either through government influence or outright control, helps encourage
the public to put their funds in these institutions, thereby giving them the resources to lend to
whomever the government wants them too. 
Stern and Feldman acknowledge that all three motivations are important in promoting too-
big-to-fail, but take the view that the most important is policymakers’ concerns about spillovers.
The third motivation is clearly unimportant in the United States, because the U.S. government
generally stays out of directing bank credit.   However, it has been important elsewhere, where-7-
governments are often active in directing credit.  Stern and Feldman put less weight on personal
gain being a factor in promoting bank bailouts.  They may be taking this view because the
supervisors they have been most exposed to have been those in the Federal Reserve System.  The
Fed is unique as a supervisory agency because it is so independent and respected.  The level of
professionalism of Fed supervisors is very high, in part because they are insulated from political
pressure.  My interaction with supervisors in the Federal Reserve System convinces me that Stern
and Feldman’s are right that for this group of supervisors personal gain is not a key motivating
factor and the most important motivation promoting too-big-to-fail is concerns about spillovers.
Although currently supervisors in other agencies  probably have just as high standards of
professionalism, this has not always been the case.   Indeed, the S&L debacle and the Keating
savings and loan scandal described in Mishkin (2003) provides a counterexample where personal
gain was an important motivation for supervisory failure.   The supervisory agencies for the
savings and loan industry, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Fund (FSLIC),  engaged in regulatory forbearance in which they swept things under the
rug by allowing insolvent S&Ls to stay in business.  Even more outrageous was the unprecedented
step taken by the head of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, M. Danny Wall, in September 1987
who reassigned the examiners who discovered that Keating’s Lincoln Savings and Loan had
violated  numerous regulations.  He then took the supervision of Lincoln Savings and Loan away
from the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank, where it belonged, and moved it to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board in Washington where Lincoln was not examined for the next ten months,
so that Lincoln dropped into a “regulatory black hole.” 
Whether personal gain could now be an important motivation for supervisory failure and
bank bailouts is debatable in the United States, but concerns about personal gain are almost surely
a more important driving force behind supervisory failures in emerging market countries.  In
contrast to the U.S. where an educated public and a free press open up the supervisory process to
scrutiny, thereby removing some of the asymmetric information that leads to the principal-agent
problem,  bank regulators and supervisors in poorer countries are often a “grabbing hand” rather
than a “helping hand”.
5
III.
Has the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem Gotten Worse?-8-
In chapter six, Stern and Feldman argue that the too-big-to-fail problem is getting worse
and that despite views to the contrary, the FDICIA legislation of 1991 has not fixed the
problem.  The chapter does a nice job of outlining the forces that may be increasing too-big-to-
fail coverage and hence the too-big-to-fail problem.  First, banking consolidation has led to the
largest banks getting larger, so that a failure of one of these mega banks would pose even
greater systemic risk.  Second, bank consolidation has led to a greater number of banks that
have reached a sufficient scale that their failure would have costly spillovers.  Third technology
has allowed institutions that are not among the largest to play a more important role in the
payments system, and so a failure of one of these institutions could disrupt the payments system
and lead to systemic effects.  Fourth, technology which has improved the quality of information
has encouraged the development of capital markets which have enabled banks to increase their
use of uninsured deposits and other credit to fund their operations.  The increased dependence
on these sources of funding may make banks more vulnerable.
6  Fifth, banking operations have
been growing in complexity which can make the resolution of failed banking organizations
more difficult to resolve, thereby making them, as Herring (2002) has put it, “too complex to
fail”.
7  Sixth, legislation like the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, has enabled banks to engage in a wider range
of activities and has allowed the merger of banks with other financial institutions, thus possibly
expanding the government safety net to non-bank activities of these financial conglomerates.
Stern and Feldman make a convincing case that the above forces have the potential to
strengthen the too-big-to-fail commitment to fully protect all depositors at large banks, thereby
increasing the incentives for large banks to take on excessive risk and worsening the too-big-to-
fail problem.   Making this case, however,  does not mean that the too-big-to-fail problem is
now worse than it was.  In 1991, the landmark FDICIA legislation was passed, with a number
of provisions to reduce the too-big-to-fail problem.  Most importantly, FDICIA required the
FDIC to close banks with a “least-cost” resolution procedure, making it more likely that
uninsured depositors and creditors will suffer losses when a bank fails.  In addition, FDICIA
promoted measures to reduce the likelihood that a bank failure would lead to systemic risk.  It
directed the Board of Governors to develop a regulation which would limit interbank credit
exposure, and the Board responded with Regulation F, which restricts the interday exposure to
a not adequately capitalized correspondent to less than 25% of the bank’s capital.  To prevent
a systemic liquidity problem from developing because other financial institutions might not
have immediate access to their funds at a failed bank, FDICIA also authorized the FDIC to
make a final settlement with creditors (based on the FDIC’s average recovery experience) when
it assumes receivership of a failed bank.  In addition, FDICIA explicitly recognized contractual-9-
netting agreements (that allow payments to be offset against each other) and held them legally
binding, thereby reducing short-term credit exposure and making the clean up after a bank
substantially easier.
Stern and Feldman take a more jaundiced view of FDICIA, arguing that it has not done
much to fix the too-big-to-fail problem.  I have had a more positive  view of FDICIA (Mishkin,
1997) and continue to do so.
8  Stern and Feldman believe that FDICIA’s least cost resolution
provision has no bite because FDICIA has a systemic risk exception.  A bank can in effect be
declared too-big-to-fail so that all depositors, both insured and uninsured, would be fully
protected if not doing so would “have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability”.  To invoke the systemic risk exception, a two-third’s majority of both the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the directors of the FDIC, as well as the
approval of the secretary of the Treasury, is required.  The Secretary of the Treasury must also
document evidence that a systemic-risk exception was necessary, and the General Accounting
Office must review the actions taken to comment whether they appeared to be necessary. 
Furthermore, the banking industry has to pay the cost of a too-big-to-fail bailout through an
emergency assessment to the FDIC as a proportion of each bank's tangible assets. 
Stern and Feldman take the view that the systemic-risk exception is a loophole which can
be used in cases where no systemic risk is present and so there will be no “significant change in
the incentives that policymakers face when confronted with the bailout decision” (p.79).  I
strongly disagree.
The debate here is quite similar to the rules versus discretion debate that has been
prominent in macroeconomics.  Advocates of rules argue that discretion leads to the time-
inconsistency problem in which optimal discretionary policies at a given point in time lead to a
sequence of policies that are suboptimal.  Discretionary policies lead to expectations that they will
continue to be used in the future, which leads to undesirable behavior on the part of economic
agents.  This is exactly the same argument used by those who criticize the use of discretion in
exercising the systematic risk exception.  If the systemic risk exception can be exercised in some
cases, banks and markets will expect that will be exercised in the future, thus leaving too-big-to-
fail in place.
Advocates of discretion counter that rules are often too rigid because there are often
circumstances which could not be predicted, requiring the exercise of discretion.  Thus they
oppose rules because strict adherence to them has the potential for disaster.  Financial crises and
systemic risk stem from events which are highly unpredictable and which have highly
unpredictable consequences.  Because the history of financial crises shows that systemic risk
situations which are unexpected can be very damaging to the economy (Kindleberger, 1978,-10-
Bernanke, 1983, and Mishkin, 1991, 1996), there is a strong case for discretionary actions to
contain them. 
As discussed in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), the dichotomy between rules and discretion
may be misleading.  Time inconsistency can be avoided even if rules are not rigid, as long as the
exceptions to them are infrequent because they are not easy to implement, and policymakers are
accountable to credibly explain why an exception has been necessary.  This is exactly what
FDICIA does.  FDICIA makes it hard to invoke the systemic-risk exception because the FDIC,
the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury must all agree to do so.  Furthermore, the provisions
in FDICIA which require documentation of evidence to support the view that a failure of a large
bank would lead to systemic risk makes the regulatory authorities accountable when they invoke
the systemic-risk exception.  In addition, the emergency assessment produces incentives for the
industry to question the abandonment of least-cost resolution, thus encouraging them to monitor
the regulators to make sure that they do not invoke the systemic-risk exception too often.
Stern and Feldman think that these provisions will not make much of a difference because
before FDICIA was enacted,  the Federal Reserve, the Treasury and the FDIC consulted with each
other when there were bail outs of large banks and there were active public discussions of these
bailouts.  FDICIA, however, does set up clearer rules for making the decision process more
transparent when a too-big-to-fail bailout occurs.  This institutionalization of transparency is one
of the key arguments for inflation targeting (Bernanke et al, 1999) and institutionalization of
transparency for too-big-to-fail policies should have similar benefits.
FDICIA sensibly allows for discretion with the systemic risk exception because of the
potential for unforeseen circumstances and the potential high cost of a financial crisis.  However,
FDICIA allows discretion in a clever way so that there are strong incentives for the regulators to
follow the least-cost resolution rule, except under highly unusual circumstances.  Thus I disagree
with Stern and Feldman that the provisions in FDICIA do not limit too-big-to-fail coverage.   The
balance between rules and discretion provided by FDICIA seems to me to be both  reasonable and
desirable and does substantially limit the too-big-to-fail problem.
Another important development  that also could have reduced the too-big-to-fail problem
was that bank capital requirements were substantially strengthened in the late 1980s, especially
after the 1988 Basel Accord which standardized bank capital requirements internationally.   The
1988 Basel Accord has been praised for increasing the focus on risk when it put in place risk-
weights for calculating capital requirements.  However, another important success, that is often
less recognized, is that it forced banks, particularly large ones, to increase their capital
substantially.  With more capital, a large bank has more to lose if it goes under and thus has less
incentives to take on risk.  Higher capital requirements thus also make the too-big-to-fail-11-
problem less severe.
What does the evidence tell us about whether the too-big-to-fail is a bigger problem now
than in the 1980s?  My reading is quite different than Stern and Feldman’s.  The evidence does
not support a worsening of the too-big-to-fail problem.  To the contrary, the evidence seems to
support that there has been substantial improvement on this score.
One way of assessing whether the too-big-to-fail problem has gotten worse is to examine
whether yields on bonds issued by banks reflect the riskiness of large bank’s activities.  As noted
by Stern and Feldman, in the early 1980s, bank bond yields did not reflect much risk, which is
consistent with too-big-to-fail because bondholders would not price in riskiness of the bank if the
bank was expected to get government support if it were too-big-to-fail.  During the late 1980s and
1990s, however, the relationship between bank bond yields and bank riskiness became much
stronger (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996 and Flannery and Nikolova, 2004).  Stern and Feldman
correctly point out that the fact that bond yields at large banks reflect the bank’s riskiness does not
imply that too-big-to-fail is not having an impact.  Even if the market expects bank bailouts, there
is some probability that the bailout will not occur, so that bank risk should still be priced.  Indeed,
more recent work such as Morgan and Stiroh (2005), do find that the spread-rating relationship
was flatter for large banks in the 1990s, suggesting that the market still sees that large banks are
more likely to receive bailouts.  Nevertheless, the fact that bond yields now do reflect a bank’s
riskiness suggests that the too-big-to-fail problem is not as bad as it once was.
Even more persuasive evidence that the too-big-to-fail problem has not gotten worse is
provided using the methodology in Boyd and Gertler (1993).  Boyd and Gertler argued that
when banks take on more risk, they are likely to have riskier returns and are thus more likely
to face difficulties later.  Boyd and Gertler  found that in the mid to late 1980s, the largest banks
performed worse than smaller banks and were the source of the overall poor performance of the
industry in that period.  They concluded that large banks were taking on more risk, exactly as
would be expected because of the too-big-to-fail policy.  In addition, large banks had lower
capital ratios than smaller banks, also indicating that they were bearing more risk.   Boyd and
Gertler’s evidence thus provides strong support for Stern and Feldman’s view that too-big-to-
fail was a serious problem in the United States.
However, there has been a sea-change in the industry since 1991. As has been
documented in Ennis, and Malek (2005), after FDICIA was enacted, the banking industry in the
United States has returned to profitability, with return on assets that are even higher than in the
1970s .  Even more telling is the change in the relative profitability of large and small banks.
In the 1983-1991 period, the largest banks had a return on assets which was less than half that
of mid-size banks.  After 1991, the return on assets has been quite similar for the largest and-12-
mid-size banks, with the largest banks having a slightly higher return on assets.  This change
could just reflect idiosyncratic features of the recent sample period relative to the earlier period,
but an alternative explanation is that  the passage of FDICIA has limited the too-big-to-fail
problem.
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The second striking change in the characteristics of the banking industry is what has
happened to capital ratios since 1991.  Before 1991, the largest banks (greater than $10 billion
in asset size) had extremely low  capital ratios, with average equity capital just a little over 5%
of assets (whether relative to total assets or relative to a risk-weighted measure developed under
the 1988 Basel Accord which required banks to hold 8% of risk-weighted capital).  Consistent
with too-big-to-fail incentives for large banks to take on excessive risk, before 1991 capital
ratios fell as the size of banks grew (as shown in Table 1), with the smallest banks having
capital ratios almost double those of the largest banks.  After 1991, this pattern began to change
dramatically (Table 1).  By 2004, the largest banks have more than doubled their capital ratios
and are now well capitalized, more than meeting the Basel requirements.  Furthermore, they no
longer have less capital than smaller banks, except for the smallest with less than $100 million
in assets.  (The smallest banks, the so-called community banks, are often unable to diversify
their loan portfolios that are dominated by local loans, and they need to have higher capital to
offset the resulting higher risk.)   The higher capital ratios for large banks suggest that they are
no longer as willing to take on risk.  This could reflect the fact that their counterparties perceive
that the large banks are less likely to be bailed out and so the large banks must be safer in order
to get counterparties’ business.  The higher capital ratio for large banks provides another reason
why too-big-to-fail is likely to be less of a problem: higher capital means that large banks  have
more to lose if they get in trouble and this also mitigates any incentives to take on risk created
by too-big-to-fail.
An additional feature of the current environment that suggests that the too-big-to-fail
problem has lessened is the increase in large banks’ franchise value, the present value of future
profits that the bank is expected to earn if it stays in business.  With the rise in large banks’
profits in recent years which has also been reflected in a substantial rise in their stock prices,
these banks now have an additional reason why they have a lot to lose if they get into trouble.
Even if they are deemed too-big-to-fail and all depositors are bailed out if they are subject to
closure, a closure still means that these banks lose their franchise value.  Their high franchise
value thus gives these banks strong incentives to manage risk in order to prevent failure, and
high franchise value  offsets the incentives to take on too much risk created by too-big-to-fail.
Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) provide evidence that banks with higher franchise
value take on less risk, one manifestation of which is higher capital ratios.  Increased franchise-13-
value of large banks can thus also  help explain the dramatic shift to higher capital ratios for
large banks we see in Table 1.  We currently find ourselves in the opposite situation to that
described by Keeley (1990) who documented the large decline in franchise value in the banking
system that occurred before the 1980s, which he argues led to the increased risk-taking in the
1980s by banking institutions that  led to the numerous bank failures of that period.  High
franchise values of large banks mean that incentives for large banks to exploit too-big-to-fail
and take on excessive risk are unlikely to be strong at the present time.
What is the bottom line on the status of the too-big-to-fail problem?  Stern and Feldman
have not made the case that the too-big-to-fail problem has gotten more severe.  Indeed, there
is substantial evidence that the opposite is the case: the too-big-to-fail problem appears to be
far less severe now than it was in the 1980s.  Their criticisms of the FDICIA legislation’s ability
to lessen the too-big-to-fail problem also seem to me to be overstated.   However, Stern and
Feldman have made the case that the too-big-to-fail problem could get more severe in the future
because of changes in the banking industry.  It is therefore a problem of important concern to
policymakers.
IV.
Policies to Cope With Too-Big-to-Fail
The second part of Stern and Feldman’s book outlines policies to deal with the too-big-
to-fail problem.  Their discussion of policy alternatives is both thoughtful and reasonable.
In chapter 8, they use the analogy to successes on the monetary policy front to advocate
appointment of policymakers to head regulatory/supervisory agencies  who take seriously the
moral hazard costs of bank bailouts.   Stern and Feldman discuss how appointment of a
“conservative” central banker as suggested in Rogoff (1985) helps deal with the time-
inconsistency problem.  A conservative central banker who puts more weight on inflation
control than output stabilization will be less likely to pursue short-run policies to stimulate
aggregate demand and instead will take a longer run view to control inflation.  Similarly, a
“conservative” policymaker who puts  greater weight on the moral hazard costs of bank bailouts
will be less likely to implement too-big-to-fail bailouts.  If this “conservative”
regulator/supervisor makes it clear that he or she will be more reluctant to engage in bailouts,
possibly by supporting reforms to make bailouts less likely as Stern and Feldman suggest, the
market will have more incentives to monitor large banks and punish them if they take on too
much risk.   But note that appointment of a “conservative” regulator/supervisor does not need
to be justified by too-big-to-fail being a serious problem.  A “conservative” regulator/supervisor-14-
makes bank bailouts less likely for small as well as large banking instituitons and so can help
reduce moral hazard created by the government safety net even if large banks are not treated
differently from small banks.
Stern and Feldman’s makes a good argument for appointment of “conservative” bank
regulators/supervisors and ones who have expertise in dealing with financial disruptions so that
they can make an appropriate judgement as to whether there needs to be intervention to deal with
financial instability.  Having “liberal” supervisors can lead to disasters as suggested by the
earlier cited example of M. Danny Wall’s intervention on behalf of Keating’s Lincoln Savings
and Loan. Lincoln finally failed in April 1989, with costs to the U.S. taxpayer of over $2 billion.
Here the cost of having a  “liberal” supervisor was high, even though Lincoln Savings and Loan
was not thought of as too-big-to-fail.  (On the other hand Lincoln was certainly politically
connected as is illustrated by the scandal of the “Keating Five” senators –  Dennis De Concini,
Alan Cranston, Donald Riegle, John Glenn and John McCain – who interceded on Keating’s
behalf with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.)
Although dealing with time-inconsistency problems by appointing a “conservative”
policymaker has attractive theoretical properties, it is not so easy to implement in practice.  Mishkin
and Westelius (2005) point out two difficulties with this approach to solving the time-inconsistency
problem in monetary policy.    First, it may be hard to find a central banker with the “right”
preferences and it is hard to believe that politicians would naturally want to appoint central bankers
with different preferences than theirs.  Second,  an opportunistic government would also be unlikely
to appoint a “conservative” central banker, so that a regime based on having a “conservative” central
banker is unlikely to be stable over time.  Similar objections apply to appointment of a
“conservative” regulator/supervisor.   Stern and Feldman recognize that appointment of a
“conservative” regulator/supervisor is not enough to deal with the too-big-to-fail problem and  go
on in the subsequent chapters to outline other reforms.
In chapter 9, Stern and Feldman discuss reforms that can improve the regulatory and
supervisory process.  These include reforms such as establishing strong property rights and
bankruptcy laws.  In addition, they advocate improved budgetary disclosure and accounting to
reflect the implicit liabilities of the government arising from the government safety net.  These
reforms can help ensure that excessive risk taking does not occur in the banking system and that the
tendency to bail out banking institutions will be reduced.   These reforms can be important in
reducing risk taking even if too-big-to-fail is not as big a problem as Stern and Feldman contend.
They can help the reduce moral hazard incentives for excessive risk-taking created by the
government safety net even if large banks are not treated differently from small banks.
In the next three chapters, Stern and Feldman focus on reforms that can reduce the cost of-15-
a large bank failure and thereby make the commitment to not bail out a large bank more credible.
One implication of their analysis in the first part of the book is that policymakers are less likely
to suffer from the time-inconsistency problem and promote a too-big-to-fail policy when a large
bank failure imposes lower costs on the economy.  With lower costs of a large bank failure,
policymakers have less incentives to renege on no bailout pledges.  The importance in their
analysis of reducing the time-inconsistency problem explains why the bulk of their policy
recommendations focus on reducing costs of large bank failures.
Stern and Feldman discuss reforms to reduce supervisors’ uncertainty about the impact of
a failure of large banks in chapter ten.  They first suggest that supervisors engage in scenario
planning by conducting simulations of large bank failures and use this exercise to think about what
should be done when such a failure occurs.  Scenario planning is akin to what the military does when
it engages in training exercises and the benefits are well known.  However, as the recent episode of
the devastation of New Orleans by hurricane Katrina makes clear, where there were training
exercises to deal with exactly this kind of disaster, scenario planning is not a panacea: it will still
fall short if the lessons from these exercises are not acted upon.
Stern and Feldman also suggest clarifying the legal and regulatory standing of bank creditors
before a failure actually occurs, thereby enabling the markets to take steps to lower the costs of bank
failures.  They also advocate that supervisors target banking institutions that are important in the
payment system and ensure that these institutions  take steps that make the disruption of their
payments activities less likely.  Expediting payments to creditors when banks fail, a feature of
FDICIA, makes it less likely that liquidity squeezes will occur after a large bank failure, thus also
reducing the cost of a large bank failure.
Chapter eleven provides recommendations to limit creditor losses when there is a bank
failure, another approach to reducing costs from a large bank failure.  Shutting down insolvent
banks before their losses become too large not only reduces costs to taxpayers when a bank fails
but also results in lower losses for uninsured creditors.  Prompt corrective action, in which bank
supervisors intervene earlier when there is a deterioration in bank balance sheets and is a central
element of the FDICIA legislation, has made substantial strides in this direction.  Stern and
Feldman point out, however, that the triggers for prompt corrective action may not work early
enough when they are based on historical-cost accounting measures as they are in FDICIA.  They
suggest that this problem could be solved if the triggers were based on market valuations of bank
balance sheets.  Proposals for greater use of market valuations have received support from
academic economists for a long time.  Although there are objections to market-value-based
accounting because it is not straightforward to obtain market-value estimates of bank capital, more
supervisory focus on market valuation can help promote earlier interventions to close down weak-16-
banking institutions.   Again, a severe too-big-to-fail problem is not needed to justify improving
the triggers for prompt corrective action: better triggers  limit taxpayer and private creditor losses
and reduce incentives for risk-taking for small as well as large banks. 
Stern and Feldman discuss other possible reforms to lower costs to creditors.  They
mention the possible benefits of rapid recapitalization of banks in a weakened condition, but also
worry that  rapid recapitalization could make matters worse by giving banks more incentives to
take on risk.  Coinsurance for large creditors is another option but setting the rate to get the right
balance between the tradeoff between moral hazard and financial instability is tricky.  Stern and
Feldman also discuss a proposal that I have outlined (Mishkin, 1999, and Mishkin and Strahan,
1999) in which the supervisory agencies announce that there is a strong presumption that the first
large bank to fail will not be treated as too-big-to-fail, and costs will be imposed on uninsured
depositors and creditors when the bank is closed.  However, the authorities will stand ready to
extend the safety net to the rest of the banking system if they perceive that there is a serious
systemic risk problem.  The advantage of this proposal is that it would encourage uninsured
depositors and creditors to monitor large banks because they would have to worry that it might
be the first one to fail and so would not be bailed out.  Yet, the costs of the  first bank failure
would then be contained so that a banking crisis would be avoided.  Stern and Feldman worry that
this reform might not work because uninsured creditors of a bank could game the system by
propping up the bank so that it does not fail first.  However, the free-rider problem makes this
unlikely because this gaming would require substantial cooperation among these creditors and yet
individual creditors would have an incentive to free ride off of others.  A more valid criticism of
this reform raised by Stern and Feldman is that the commitment to not bail out the first large bank
that fails might not be credible because it would impose high costs on the economy.  However,
Stern and Friedman point out that other reforms they suggest that would lower the costs of a large
bank failure might make this “first one fails” reform more operational.
Chapter twelve outlines reforms to restrict spillovers to the payments system from a large
bank failure.  Stern and Feldman discuss reforms which reduce the amount banks owe each other
through the payment system and make it easier for banks owed money by a failed bank to offset
their losses with collateral.  Stern and Feldman emphasize these reforms because fears that the
payment system will be disrupted by a large bank failure are one of the key reasons why
policymakers are likely to adopt a too-big-to-fail policy.   In designing a successful payments
system, the devil is in the details.    Stern and Feldman’s discussion of this complex topic is quite
clear and makes eminent sense to me although I am not an expert on payments systems.
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Stern and Feldman’s chapter thirteen (which has associated appendices) briefly examines
alterative views from theirs on managing the too-big-to-fail problem.  Stern and Feldman discount-17-
the importance of penalizing policymakers whose actions result in more bank bailouts, and see
personal motivation as of secondary importance in promoting banking crises.   However, as my
discussion of their chapter five suggests, personal motivation has played a more prominent role
in banking crises than they give credit.  Increasing costs for bank supervisors whose actions result
in more bailouts can improve the incentives of supervisors to constrain banks from taking on too
much risk and the best way to do this is by increasing transparency of their actions. Indeed,
FDICIA goes down this route by establishing prompt corrective action which provides explicit
standards on what supervisory actions should be taken as a bank’s balance-sheet position
deteriorates.  In addition, FDICIA requires a mandatory review of any bank failure that imposes
costs on the FDIC and this report is available to the public.  Stern and Feldman discount the
importance of these provisions because a member of Congress can request an investigation of
supervisory actions for a failed bank at any time.  My work on inflation targeting leads me to
believe that setting explicit standards for policymakers behavior and institutionalizing
transparency does result in better incentives for policymakers to do their job well.  I believe that
the same is true for bank supervision.  There is a general perception that bank supervision in the
United States has improved post FDICIA and I would attribute some of this improvement to the
provisions in this legislation that focus on personal motivations of bank supervisors and increase
transparency of the supervisory process.
Stern and Feldman also argue that supervision and regulation should not be the only, or
primary, response to the too-big-to-fail problem.  There is strong empirical support that supervison
and regulation may not produce good outcomes in developing countries with weak institutional
environments (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2005).  This research finds that supervision and
regulation in such cases may reflect a “grabbing hand” of government rather than a “helping
hand”, and giving strong discretionary powers to supervisors may actually make things worse not
better.  However, supervisors in the rich countries with strong institutional environments might
dispute Stern and Feldman’s view.  They might argue for a more prominent role for supervision
and regulation to contain the  moral hazard incentives for risk taking arising from too-big-to-fail.
A more prominent role for supervision and regulation, however, does not weaken the case that
many of the reforms suggested by Stern and Feldman  would assist supervisors since these reforms
help reduce moral hazard incentives in banks, thereby making the supervisors job easier. 
Stern and Feldman are supportive of reforms that would increase market discipline, but
they correctly point out that market discipline only works for large banks if the market expects that
they will not be bailed out.   If a too-big-to-fail policy is in place, the market will not price in the
riskiness of a large bank into its securities prices because bank creditors will only suffer losses if
the too-big-to-fail policy is limited.  Stern and Feldman advocate reforms to increase market-18-
discipline, but as a complement to their proposals.
The book ends with a final chapter that provides a clear recap of Stern and Feldman’s
argument.  Because they recognize that they may bore the reader with a traditional summary, Stern
and Feldman provide the recap with a series of very brief “talking points”.
IV.
Conclusion
Stern and Feldman have written an important book on the too-big-to-fail problem. 
Although I think that they have overstated their case that too-big-to-fail is the central
problem for bank regulation and supervision, the too-big-to-fail problem has the potential to
get more serious over time.  Furthermore, even if the too-big-to-fail problem is not as
serious as they contend the policies they outline can make it less likely that a banking crisis
will occur even if driven by other factors.  This book deserves to be widely read in the
banking regulation and supervisory world. -19-
1. Gary H. Stern, and Ron J. Feldman,  Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts (Wash.
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
2. For recent evidence that bank failures lead to a loss of information capital that leads to a
decline in loans and economic activity, see Ashcraft (2004).  Interestingly, this paper finds that
while larger bank failures are ten times larger than small bank failures, the effect on local area
income is only twice as large.  This result suggests that it is small business lending that makes
banks special given that small banks concentrate on lending to small businesses.
3. References to these studies can be found in Stern and Feldman (2004).
4. I discuss these issues more extensively in my forthcoming book, Mishkin (2005).
5. See Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004)
6.  Note however, that the increased use of uninsured deposits can imply that large banks are more
subject to market discipline because larger depositors are more likely to impose discipline on a
bank.
7. In addition, there are tricky issues in supervisors assessing risk management for these
complex financial conglomerates (Kuritzkes, Schuerman and Weiner, 2003).
8. Also see Bentson and Kaufman (1997) and Kaufman (1997) for more favorable views on
FDICIA.
9. Another possible factor for improved performance of large banks is that they have adopted
better risk management tools.  Schuermann (2005) provides evidence that better risk
management explains the substantially improved performance of the banking industry in the
2001 recession relative to the previous 1990-91 recession.
10. I did consult an expert in this area who was impressed by this chapter and felt that Stern and
Feldman present a nicely balanced picture.
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Table 1: Average Equity Capital Ratios for U.S. Commercial Banks,
1983-2004 by Asset Size















































1983 10.3 9.0 7.9 7.8 7.1 7.0 6.2 6.0 5.0 4.6
1984 10.1 9.0 7.8 7.8 7.1 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.2 5.0
1985 10.0 8.9 7.8 7.8 7.1 7.0 6.5 6.2 5.3 5.1
1986 9.7 8.7 7.7 7.7 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.3 5.3 5.2
1987 9.9 8.9 8.0 8.0 7.3 7.1 6.7 6.4 5.1 4.6
1988 10.0 9.0 8.1 8.0 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.4 5.3 5.2
1989 10.2 9.2 8.3 8.2 7.5 7.4 6.6 6.4 5.3 5.0
1990 10.2 9.2 8.3 8.3 7.6 7.5 6.9 6.5 5.7 5.4
1991 10.3 9.3 8.5 8.4 7.8 7.7 7.2 6.9 6.3 5.7
1992 10.5 9.5 8.9 8.9 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.0 6.7
1993 10.8 10.0 9.4 9.4 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.1 7.7 7.4
1994 10.9 10.0 9.4 9.3 8.8 8.8 8.1 8.0 7.5 7.1
1995 11.8 10.6 10.1 10.0 9.4 9.3 8.6 8.5 7.8 7.3
1996 12.2 10.8 10.1 10.0 9.4 9.3 8.7 8.7 7.9 7.5
1997 13.1 11.1 10.3 10.2 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.8 8.1 7.6
1998 13.5 11.3 10.2 10.1 9.7 9.6 9.3 9.5 8.3 7.9
1999 13.5 11.1 9.7 9.7 9.4 9.4 8.8 9.1 8.3 7.9
2000 13.9 11.4 10.1 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.2 9.1 8.7 8.1
2001 13.5 11.2 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.9 9.3 8.7
2002 13.7 11.4 10.3 10.2 9.9 9.9 10.4 10.5 9.3 8.8
2003 14.1 11.6 10.3 10.2 9.9 9.9 10.6 10.7 9.7 8.7
2004 14.3 11.8 10.4 10.3 10.1 10.2 10.9 11.0 11.1 10.0
Source:  Call Report data available on the Chicago Fed's website: http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm 